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Disincentivizing Elder Abuse Through
Disinheritance: Revamping California Probate Code
§ 259 and Using It as a Model
I. INTRODUCTION
Police found Ms. Brown, a seventy-four-year-old woman,
partially fused to an arm chair surrounded by her own filth. 1 Her son
and primary caretaker, James Owens, left her in the chair for days,
allegedly complying with her request to let her die at home. 2 Luckily
for Ms. Brown, James tried to endorse her social security check, and
authorities eventually found her. 3 Ms. Brown was pried from her arm
chair and died of a stroke in the hospital several days later, and James
was eventually sentenced to one year in prison. 4 Although it is
shocking that police found Ms. Brown in such a life-threatening and
atrocious condition, it is almost equally shocking that nothing in
Missouri’s elder abuse statutes would keep James from inheriting
from his mother’s estate. 5
Accounts like this are disconcerting for several reasons. First, for
every disheartening story of elder abuse, there are several—perhaps
dozens of—other stories that are never reported. Second, abusers
have an eighty-four percent chance of living in a state that has not
yet enacted a statute that disinherits elder abusers. 6 Third, even in
the eight states that have recognized that stories like Ms. Brown’s are
a major problem, 7 the statutes that states have enacted to deal

1. Matt Campbell, Son of Independence Woman Fused to Chair Pleads to Abuse, KANSAS
CITY
STAR
(Sep.
20,
2012,
1:28
AM),
http://www.kansas.com/2012/09/19/2496444/independence-man-pleads-to-elder.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Missouri statutes create a class A felony for “knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to
cause serious physical injury” to persons above the age of sixty, but they do not have a clause
disinheriting those who commit this felony. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.180 (West 2012).
6. See infra Figure 1.
7. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456; 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2 (West
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (West); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801 (West
2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.465 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.84.020
(West 2012).
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with this problem fail to provide strong incentives for people closest
to elders to report abuse.
Existing scholarship tends to welcome elder abuse disinheritance
statutes without extreme criticism, noting their potential deterrent
effects. 8 However, I argue that these statutes have severely limited
their potential deterrent effects by relying too strongly on antiquated
notions of inheritance rights, by refusing to treat many forms of
elder abuse as perpetrations that can be deterred by probate law, and
by refusing to disengage themselves from criminal law.
Most enacted elder abuse disinheritance statutes suffer from one
of two common deficiencies. First, six of the eight states that have
enacted such statutes require a criminal conviction, which deprives
family members of an incentive to report and prosecute the abuse
because they may lack evidence to support a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Second, three of the states provide for
disinheritance only in cases of financial elder abuse, relying on false
ideas about which kinds of abusive acts actually relate to inheritance.
California’s statute does not suffer from the foregoing
deficiencies, but it is particularly weak because it merely offsets the
amount that an abuser would receive through inheritance by the
amount of any judgment awarded to the abused elder’s estate. 9
These statutes provide a poor guide for states that are considering
such legislation, as evidenced by a recent proposal in Connecticut
that perpetuates many of their shortcomings. 10 Figure 1 outlines the
current condition of elder abuse disinheritance statutes in the eight
states that have passed them.

8. Lisa C. Dumond, The Undeserving Heir: Domestic Elder Abuser’s Right to Inherit, 23
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 214, 237 (2010); Carla Spivack, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse
Should Bar Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REV. 247, 274–76 (2011) (using elder abuse disinheritance
statutes as an example of what spousal abuse disinheritance statutes could be).
9. I provide a much more detailed account of how this statute works in Part III.
10. See Dumond, supra note 8 at 234–35 (proposing a statute that requires a conviction
of elder abuse to become effective, while lowering the standard of proof for the mens rea
element of the conviction). Although the intentions of this proposal are clearly in the right
direction, it is unclear how lowering the standard of proof for the mens rea element would
provide the right incentives if the actus reas portion of the statute still requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Figure 1

State

Statute
Requires
Criminal
Conviction

Statute Targets
Only Financial
Elder Abuse

Arizona

√

√

California

√

Illinois

√

Kentucky

√

Maryland

√

Michigan

√

Oregon

√

Washington

Statute
Provides a
Weak
Penalty

√

√

Several authors have criticized California’s incomplete effort at
disincentivizing elder abuse, 11 but none have proposed language to
fix this statute. Small changes in California’s elder abuse
disinheritance statute could transform it into a model statute that
effectively disincentivizes many forms of elder abuse while still

11. See Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: California Breaks
New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 537 (2001) (discussing the disinheritance statute’s shortcomings); Anne-Marie
Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 ACTEC J. 143, 173 (2010) (“The significance of section 259
lies not in its sweep but its existence.”); Thomas H. Shepherd, It’s the 21st Century . . . Time
for Probate Codes to Address Family Violence: A Proposal That Deals with the Realities of the
Problem, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 449, 473 (2001) (criticizing California Probate § 259
as a failure to address familial abuse done at earlier ages and proposing a statute that seeks
broader application). Mr. Shepherd’s proposal is closest to my own, but it applies to abuse that
happens to minors. See Shepherd, supra at 464–65. A statute of this magnitude is beyond the
scope of this Comment and raises many issues about testamentary freedom.
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respecting testamentary freedom of elders, and I propose such
changes in this Comment. The most effective way to ensure that
states are aware of this model statute would be to include it in the
Uniform Probate Code. 12
Following this introduction, Part II explains why treating elder
abuse as a probate law problem—and not just a criminal law
problem—will successfully supplement state criminal elder abuse
statutes by disincentivizing elder abuse by family members. Part II
also explains why enacting elder abuse disinheritance legislation falls
clearly within states’ powers under the Constitution, even if it is a
break from antiquated notions of inheritance rights. Part III explains
why the common law doctrine of undue influence is inadequate to
prevent or remedy elder abuse. Part IV explains why existing
disinheritance elder abuse statutes in the states of Washington,
Oregon, California, Illinois, Arizona, Kentucky, Michigan, and
Maryland are also ineffective in preventing many kinds of elder abuse
by family members and thus, why new legislation is needed. Part V
explains the changes to California Probate Code § 259 that will be
needed—if it is used as a model statute—to curb the epidemic of
elder abuse and presents a proposed draft of such chances. Part VI
concludes.
II. GENERAL CRIMINAL ELDER ABUSE LAWS
The number of incidents of elder abuse is rapidly increasing. Yet
no one knows how big the problem really is. One report claims that
elder abuse has increased by fifty percent since 1980. 13 Others
estimate that between one and two million elderly people are abused
each year, but the estimates vary greatly. 14 Even the most shocking
report may actually be conservative, however, because “studies have
12. Cf. Spivack, supra note 8 (proposing a Uniform Probate Code section that
disinherits spousal abusers).
13. H.R. Rep. No. 101-997, pt. II.II (1990).
14. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT AND
EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 1 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003)
(“According to the best available estimates, between 1 and 2 million Americans age 65 or
older have been injured, exploited, or otherwise mistreated by someone on whom they
depended for care or protection.”); Jill C. Skabronski, Elder Abuse: Washington’s Response to a
Growing Epidemic, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 627, 629 (1996) (“It is estimated that 700,000 to
2,000,000 elderly persons are abused each year.” (citing John J. Regan, Planning for Aging or
Incapacity 1994: Legal and Financial Issues, in ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION
1994, at 548–59)).
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found that only one of every 13 or 14 cases of abuse is ever
reported.” 15 Whatever the actual number of abuse incidents is, this
number is likely to escalate as older people continue to live “longer
and longer.” 16
One piece of the puzzle concerning underreporting of elder
abuse may be that elder abuse “is largely hidden under the shroud of
family secrecy.” 17 Elder abuse—like other forms of abuse—is not
completely limited to the home, but the “typical elder abuser is
generally a somewhat distant relative or acquaintance of the elder
who is acting as caregiver.” 18 Another hypothesis is that family

15. Ralph J. Riviello, Elder Abuse, in ELDER ABUSE, IN EVIDENCE-BASED EMERGENCY
MEDICINE 635 (Brian H. Rowe ed., 2009). See also Elizabeth J. Santos & Deborah A. King,
The Assessment of Elder Abuse, in HANDBOOK OF ASSESSMENT IN CLINICAL GERONTOLOGY
229 (Peter A. Lichtenberg ed., 2d ed. 2010) (“Worldwide, the World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates that the number of older adults affected by abuse is 4–6% and this is widely
believed to be an underestimation.”); Erik J. Lindbloom et al., Elder Abuse, in EVIDENCEBASED GERIATRIC MEDICINE: A PRACTICAL CLINICAL GUIDE 166 (Jayna M. Holroyd-Leduc
& Madhuri Reddy eds., 2010) (“It is likely that at least 4% of adults 65 years of age or older
have suffered, or will suffer, some form of abuse in their later years, and this prevalence is
signiﬁcantly higher if one considers the broadest deﬁnition of elder mistreatment, including
ﬁnancial exploitation.”); NAT’L CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE AT AM. PUBLIC HUMAN SERV.
ASS’N, NATIONAL ELDER ABUSE INCIDENCE STUDY (1998) (“[O]ver five times as many new
incidents of abuse and neglect were unreported than those that were reported.”).
16. See MARY JOY QUINN & SUSAN K. TOMITA, ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CAUSES,
DIAGNOSIS, AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 6 (1986) (“There are more and more older
people, and they are living longer and longer. The 75-plus group is currently the fastest
growing segment of the population.”); Joann Blair, “Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother”—but
for How Long?—Adult Children’s Duty to Care for and Protect Elderly Parents, 35 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 765, 766 (1997) (“The burgeoning of the elderly population is a major
reason why our society must confront the problem of elder abuse immediately”); Pamela J.
Murphy, Elder Abuse: Where We Stand, WYO. LAW. 15 (Dec. 2007).
17. NAT’L CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, ELDER ABUSE INFORMATION SERIES NO. 1:
TYPES OF ELDER ABUSE IN DOMESTIC SETTINGS 1 (finding that domestic elder abuse often
goes undetected), available at http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/Resources/Publication/docs/
fact1.pdf.
18. Skabronski, supra note 14, at 632. See also Elder Justice and Protection: Stopping the
Abuse, Hearing Before the Subcommittee. on Aging of the S. Comm on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (Statement of Paul Vescovo) (“Because most abuse
occurs in the home by family members or care givers, there needs to be a concerted effort to
educate the public about the special needs and problems of the elderly.”); NAT’L CENTER ON
ELDER ABUSE, ELDER ABUSE INFORMATION SERIES NO. 2: TRENDS IN ELDER ABUSE IN
DOMESTIC SETTINGS (“Adult children are the most frequent abusers of the elderly, and this
category experienced the biggest increase in its composition of the total reports: 30.1 percent
in 1990 to 36.7 percent in 1996. Other family members and spouses ranked as the next most
likely abusers of the elderly. Other family members comprised 16.1 percent of all reports in
1990 and 10.8 percent of all reports in 1996, while spouses comprised 15.9 percent of all
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members have little incentive to report abuse after the victim has
died and the problem has ceased. So it is surprising that states have
taken few steps to deter abuse by family members.
A. Mandated Reporter Laws Fail to Address Abuse by Family Members
States have dealt with deterring elder abuse in a very logical way:
they have criminalized it, and they have mandated that certain
individuals report the abuse. States have modeled elder abuse
statutes “after legislation designed to attack the problem of child
abuse,” 19 relying on the assumption that criminalizing a heinous act
is the most effective and direct way to deter that act. 20 What
distinguishes elder abuse from most heinous acts, however, is that
elder abuse is often inextricably tied to the abuser’s right to inherit,
especially if the abuser is a family member or other trusted
individual. Elder abuse happens to elders, and so occurs relatively
close in time to when an estate plan takes effect. Further, in many
cases the abuser commits the abuse to alter the elder’s estate plan
and benefit the abuser. 21
Mandated reporter laws are under-enforced and under-inclusive,
failing to address the problem of familial elder abuse. 22 Most states
have statutes that require professionals to report elder abuse if they
think that an elder “is suffering from or has died as a result of a
[r]eportable [c]ondition.” 23 Those who fail to comply are often

reports in 1990 and 12.6 percent in 1996.”), available at http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/
Resources/Publication/docs/fact2.pdf.
19. Lawrence R. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse:
An Inappropriate, Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q.
69, 74 (1982); see also Joseph W. Barber, The Kids Aren’t All Right: The Failure of Child Abuse
Statutes as a Model for Elder Abuse Statutes, 16 ELDER L.J. 107, 115–16 (2008).
20. My purpose here is not to make some new argument in this highly controversial area
of criminal law; it is simply to offer one rational reason as to why states would focus on
criminalizing elder abuse without focusing on other civil remedies. Many claim that
criminalizing an act does nothing to deter criminals in engaging in that act. See e.g., Bazelon,
Crime: Toward a Constructive Debate, 67 A.B.A.J. 438 (1981). Others claim that deterrence
can still be achieved in a general sense, even if specific deterrence is not a realistic concept. See
e.g., Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense
Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587, 590 (1982).
21. Julia L. Birkel et al., Litigating Financial Elder Abuse Claims, L.A. LAW. 19
(October 2007) (“[O]ver 70 percent of people over the age of 50 have been approached
fraudulently, with no less than $3.8 billion lost by seniors to financial scams.”).
22. Barber, supra note 19, at 134.
23. See e.g., 651 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.02 (2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (West

450

DO NOT DELETE

445

4/14/2014 11:28 AM

Disincentivizing Elder Abuse Through Disinheritance

subject to civil damages, 24 or under more stringent statutes, may face
criminal liability. 25 Although reportable conditions cover the gamut
of abusive acts, 26 the statutes usually mandate only that certain
government and medical officials report abuse if they suspect it. 27
Encouragingly, several states have expanded their mandated reporter
laws for elder abuse to include, “[a]ny person having reasonable
cause to suspect” abuse. 28 However these states are by far the
minority, and family members are almost never listed among
mandated reporters.

2013) (mandating a person “who has seen an elder adult at risk in the course of the person’s
professional duties shall file a report with the county department”).
24. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630.1 (West 2012) (“Failure to report financial
abuse under this section shall be subject to a civil penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars
($1,000) or if the failure to report is willful, a civil penalty not exceeding five thousand dollars
($5,000)”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.24.010 (West 2013) (“A person who recklessly makes a
false report under this section is civilly liable for actual damages suffered by the person who is
the subject of the report.”).
25. See e.g., 320 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 20/4 (West 2013) (“Any other mandated
reporter required by this Act to report suspected abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation who
willfully fails to report the same is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-46-9 (West 2013) (“Any person who knowingly fails to make the required report is guilty
of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451 (West 2013) (“Any person
required to report under the provisions of this section who fails to make such report within the
prescribed time period shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, except that, if such
person intentionally fails to make such report within the prescribed time period, such person
shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor for the first offense and a class A misdemeanor for any
subsequent offense.”).
26. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3 (West 2013) (covering “willful infliction of
physical pain, physical injury, mental anguish, unreasonable confinement, or the willful
deprivation of essential services to a disabled adult or elder person”); see also ALA. CODE § 389D-2.
27. Massachusetts’s statutory scheme is representative of the type of individuals to
whom mandated reporter laws apply. For example, the Massachusetts statute levies fines on
“[a]ny physician, physician assistant, medical intern, dentist, nurse, family counselor, probation
officer, social worker, policeman, firefighter, emergency medical technician, licensed
psychologist, coroner, registered physical therapist, registered occupational therapist,
osteopath, podiatrist, executive director of a licensed home health agency or executive director
of a homemaker service agency or manager of an assisted living residence.” 651 MASS. CODE
REGS. 5.02 (2004). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-46-9 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. §
30-5-4 (West 2013): KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030 (West 2013).
28. See e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 660.255 (West 2013) (mandating that such individuals
“shall report such information”). However, under the Missouri statutes, fines are only specified
for in-home service providers and only “if the supervising in-home services provider willfully
and knowingly failed to report known abuse by such employee.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 660.255
(West 2013).
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Because mandated reporter laws were designed for child abuse
and not for elder abuse, they do not provide the right incentives to
report. Mandated reporter laws are practically identical for elder
abuse and child abuse. 29 This is problematic both because children
and elders live in different situations and because elders enjoy
different relationships with family members than children enjoy.
Elders are often more isolated than children; they do not go to
school, they are often retired, and they are not compelled by anyone
to schedule doctor’s appointments. 30 Unlike children, elders are
legally competent to make their own decisions, so even those who
suspect abuse may not want to report it because to do so would
undermine the elder’s autonomy and “self-determination.” 31
Additionally, elder abuse is much harder for doctors to diagnose
than child abuse because bruising on elderly persons can occur not
only because of abuse, but because “balance and stability decline
with age.” 32
Unlike abuse by workers in care facilities, abuse by family
members flies cleanly under the radar of mandated reporter laws.
Isolation and autonomy concerns are compacted when family
members are the abusers. Elders may be isolated in nursing homes,
but elders can be especially isolated when they are taken care of by a
relative in their own home. 33 Workers in care facilities may feel the
need to respect an elder’s autonomy, but when the potential reporter
or the abuser is a relative of the elder, the demand for respect can be
much stronger. Care facility workers often know the elder in a
physically or mentally diminished capacity. Contrastingly, family
members know elders from the time when they have been in control

29. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2010) (requiring certain individuals to
report child abuse) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 (West 2013) (requiring essentially the
same individuals to report elder abuse). See also Faulkner, supra note 19, at 79; Barber, supra
note 19, at 121.
30. Barber, supra note 19, at 121 (“If an adult chooses to remain in her home, there is
nothing the government can legally do.”).
31. Heath R. Oberloh, A Call to Legislative Action: Protecting Our Elders from Abuse,
45 S.D. L. Rev. 655, 665 (2000); Faulkner, supra note 19, at 86.
32. Barber, supra note 19, at 123–24.
33. Eloise Rathbone-McCuan, Elder Abuse Within the Context of Intimate Violence, 69
UMKC L. REV. 215, 215 (2000) (“Home health workers, social workers, and case managers
encountered elderly victims living in the midst of poverty, isolated in geographically remote
areas, or in serious conditions of social and psychological isolation.”).
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of all of their faculties and could physically and verbally defend
themselves.
Mandated reporter laws also do not incentivize elders themselves
to report abuse. Reporter laws correctly assume that many elders are
unable to report on abuse themselves because of societal pressures on
elders to preserve their dignity, their right to self-determination, and
their frailty, so self-reporting of abuse will probably not be a
reasonable expectation under any statutory scheme. 34 Elders may feel
responsible for the actions of the abuser—even if the abuser is an
adult—if the abuser is the elder’s child or grandchild. 35 Elders may
assume, reasonably, that the abusive situation at home is better than
being moved to a state facility for abuse victims, 36 or they may simply
feel very attached to their own home. Elders may fear retaliation or
may reasonably assume that they will not be believed due to memory
loss or other mental deficiencies. 37 Elders may irrationally believe
that such abuse is a deserved consequence of asking others to care
for them. 38
Mandated reporter laws overlook the pressure family members
feel not to report. This is especially true if the elders themselves are
silent. This pressure may come because they are unable to provide
the same services that the abuser provides, because they do not want
to sour family relations, or because they do not want to incur an
abusive family label if there is no actual abuse or if a conviction
cannot be made. Mandated reporter laws often give civil immunity
to professionals who make false positive reports, but this immunity

34. Molly Dickinson Velick, Mandatory Reporting Statutes: A Necessary Yet
Underutilized Response to Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER L.J. 165, 173 (1995) (“For a variety of
reasons, however, some mentally competent elderly victims cannot or will not report abuse or
seek assistance.”); Faulkner, supra note 19, at 86.
35. Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 203, 213
(2000) (“[T]he victim may believe that some deficit in the abuser’s upbringing turned the
child into an abuser and that the victim is merely suffering the consequences of his own
shortcomings.”).
36. QUINN & TOMITA, supra note 16, at 11–12; Barber, supra note 19, at 123–24.
37. Barber, supra note 19, at 123–24.
38. QUINN & TOMITA, supra note 16, at 11 (“One man who lived in a nursing home
was aware that his son had taken $90,000 from his bank account. He told the state
ombudsman, however, that he did not want his son prosecuted and he did not want to take
any steps to recover the money. ‘The money isn’t important,’ he said. ‘My son is. After all,
some family is better than none. He’s all I got.’ The son rarely visited his father in the nursing
home.”); Dessin, supra note 35, at 213.
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does not usually extend to family members. 39 Even if it did, civil
immunity does little to mend family relationships.
Policymakers have been limited to dealing with mandated
reporter laws, and so some authors have argued that states should
create shelters for elder abuse victims, enforce existing mandated
reporter laws, and increase the penalties for elder abuse. 40 These
measures would be important steps toward eradicating elder abuse,
but they do not overcome the already stated obstacles to reporting
by family members. 41 Elders and family members may have more
incentive to report abuse if there are shelters for abuse victims, but
not where the elder needs “services that cannot be delivered in a
domestic violence shelter.” 42 Also, increasing criminal penalties may
create a disincentive, especially if the elder financially supports the
abuser. 43 Other family members and interested persons may not
recognize the abuse—and in many states would have no charge to
report the abuse if they did recognize it. 44
If the problem of familial elder abuse cannot be solved by relying
on criminal elder abuse laws and their mandated reporter law
counterparts, then potential elder abusers must be disincentivized.
One effective way to do this is by disinheriting elder abusers. States
could enact statutes—much like California’s statute, but with
stronger disincentives—that bar elder abusers from inheriting from
anyone that they abuse. If such statutes were enacted, they would
likely lead to more reporting and eventually to a reduction in
incidents of abuse. Other family members would have strong

39. See e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 124.075 (West 2013). See also Oberloh, supra note
31, at 658 (“The [South Dakota] legislature has granted complete immunity to any health care
institution, its employees, agents, and staff so long as they make a “good faith” report of abuse
or neglect.”).
40. Barber, supra note 19, at 133–34.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
42. See Mary Twomey, et. al., From Behind Closed Doors: Shedding Light on Elder Abuse
and Domestic Violence in Late Life, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMS. CHILD. & CTS. 73, 76 (2005)
(claiming that elder abuse victims are confronted “with barriers that are both similar to those
faced by younger victims and also different as a result of age and disability”); Barber, supra
note 19, at 123–24.
43. QUINN & TOMITA, supra note 16, at 11; Dessin, supra note 35, at 213.
44. See Audrey S. Garfield, Elder Abuse and the States’ Adult Protective Services Response:
Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 874 (1991) (“Almost all state APS
laws mandate a wide variety of professionals to report known or suspected cases of elderly
abuse. The ‘professionals’ most often include health care and social service professionals
including law enforcement officers, social workers, physicians, and nurses.”).
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incentives to bring suit: if the abuser is disinherited, it will leave a
larger pot for the rest of the beneficiaries. This incentive does not
exist in states where there is no disinheritance statute.
B. It Is Constitutionally Permissible for States to Create Disinheritance
Statutes for Elder Abuse
Some states may have failed to enact elder abuse disinheritance
statutes due to lack of knowledge about them, but others may have
concerns about “punishing” an abuser twice and taking property
without due process of law. Under a disinheritance statute, an abuser
could potentially be punished criminally and “punished” under the
probate laws of a state, creating something similar to doublejeopardy. 45 Or, an abuser could potentially be acquitted in a criminal
trial but still be barred from inheritance in a civil action. 46 However,
inheritance is not a right granted in the United States Constitution. 47
Thus, a plaintiff in a civil suit should not be required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that elder abuse occurred because the
abuser’s “life, liberty, or property”—as those terms have been
interpreted—are not at jeopardy in cases involving inheritance. 48
Since the right to inherit is not a constitutionally guaranteed
right, states generally have free rein to determine probate laws. 49 The
Supreme Court has said that states may “even abolish the power of

45. In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702, 711–12 (Alaska 2006); In re Estate of
Benson, 548 So. 2d 775, 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that although the convicted
murderer of decedent was clearly disinherited from his mother’s estate, his children could still
inherit under his mother’s will).
46. In re Glenn’s Estate, 299 A.2d 203, 206, (Pa. 1973) (Although a son was not
found guilty of murder because of insanity that the slayer statute still applied and did not
violate his rights to due process. “There is no hint in the [slayer] Act that a prior criminal
conviction of murder is the necessary antecedent of disinheritance.”); In re Estate of Howard,
542 So. 2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (acquitted defendant disqualified under slayer
statute).
47. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ohio C.P. 1974) (“Basically,
the right to receive property by will is a creature of the law, and is not a natural right or one
guaranteed or protected by either the Ohio or the United States constitution.”). The right to
inherit is not included in any state’s constitution besides Louisiana’s. See LA. CONST. art. XII,
§ 5. However, Louisiana’s forced heirship no longer applies to adult children. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 1493 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
48. J.D. Trout & Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance,
Redistribution, and the Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765 (2000).
49. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 84–85 (1990).
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testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.” 50 This
statement can only be considered dicta because such an issue has
never come directly before the Supreme Court, 51 but it represents
the potential freedom that states have to determine inheritance laws.
If states can actually abolish the power of “testamentary disposition
over property,” then it follows that the right to inherit is not on an
equal level as—or included in the definition of—the rights to life,
liberty, and property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 52
states do not possess the power to take or abolish these fundamental
constitutional rights “without due process of law.” 53
Despite states’ broad powers over inheritance law, they may be
reticent to impinge on assumptions that testators pass their property
to relatives and friends. Children have no constitutional or statutory
right to inherit their parents’ property in most states, 54 but the
assumption that property should pass from parent to child has
worked its way into United States probate law in the forms of the
doctrine of undue influence and statutes that govern intestate
succession. 55 With undue influence, any suspicious bequest is
scrutinized by a court—and the court treats property leaving
traditional family circles as a clear indication of suspicious

50. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); see also Demorest v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944).
51. Ascher, supra note 49, at 85.
52. States have extinguished inheritance rights without considering due process by
creating a distinction between property interests, whether future or contingent, and mere
possibilities of property interests. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 700 (West 2007) (“A mere possibility,
such as the expectancy of an heir apparent, is not to be deemed an interest of any kind.”); In re
Rosin, 248 B.R. 625, 633 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (“A descendant has no present or future
interest in property owned by an ancestor, absent some conveyance . . . . Although there is a
possibility that a descendant may inherit property from an ancestor, it is only a possibility.”).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that citizens shall not “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
54. See Garfield, supra note 44.
55. In re Estate of Olson, 451 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). See also 95 C.J.S.
Wills § 242 (1956 & Supp. 2001); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 250 n.70 (1996); Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy:
Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy
Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 587 (2001) (“While courts have declared that a testator’s
bequest of property to a person who is not a natural object of his bounty raises no presumption
of mental incapacity or of undue influence, they often, and without much inquiry, deem a
testator’s disposition ‘unnatural’ when it disproportionately benefits ‘strangers of the blood.’”).
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circumstances. 56 Statutes that govern intestate succession give
decedents’ entire estates to their spouse and children if there is no
estate plan. 57 Yet there are many instances where the state removes
the right to inherit, even for family members, because it finds the
family members to be undeserving of an inheritance. Abandonment
and “slayer” statutes—statutes that remove inheritance if the
beneficiary abandons or kills the decedent—are clear examples of this.58
Even if the right to inherit were a property right protected by
either the Constitution or the traditions of state law, neither state
nor federal law requires property rights to be protected by the
criminal law’s standard of proof. The standard of proof necessary to
remove someone’s property is much lower than the standard of
proof necessary to remove someone’s liberty through criminal law. 59
The government takes property using a standard of proof far short of
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” and this has been found to not violate
the due process clause. 60
There are no real double jeopardy concerns when states enact
elder abuse disinheritance statutes. A disinheritance statute falls
under civil law, even if it would be considered a punitive device, 61
and courts draw a distinction between criminal sanctions and
punitive damages in civil cases. 62 When a defendant faces both
criminal fines and punitive civil damages for a single act, courts have
found that there is no implication of double jeopardy. 63
56. Storrow, supra note 55, at 587.
57. See e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 30.1-04-02 and 30.1-04-03 (West 2010); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.035 and 112.045 (West 2011).
58. Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the
Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 102 (2007); In Re Estate of Edward
J. Secon, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2009).
59. EDWARD RUCKER & MARCK OVERLAND, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PRACTICE:
MOTIONS, JURY INSTRUCTIONS & SENTENCING § 43:12 (3d ed.) (“Some of you may have
served as jurors in civil cases where a lesser standard of proof was employed, such as proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. In criminal cases, however, the prosecution’s proof must be
more convincing. The proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
60. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83, 92 (1972); Linda Beale, Note, Connecticut v.
Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values: The Sniadach Tetrad Revisited, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1603 (1994) (explaining the minimal due process constitutional requirements for attachment
proceedings as interpreted by several Supreme Court rulings).
61. In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702, 711 (Alaska 2006) (implying that a slayer
statute is civil, even if it is “arguably punitive” and claiming that “[i]t is unclear whether the ex
post facto clause applies to purely civil statutes”).
62. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
63. Id. (“The [Double Jeopardy] Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple
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This same constitutional logic is used to uphold certain slayer
and abandonment statutes that are triggered when clear and
convincing evidence shows that the killing or abandonment took
place. 64 A slayer can lose all rights to inheritance and face criminal
liability, but a court can find an individual not guilty in a criminal
trial and still disinherit the individual under the state’s slayer
statute. 65 There are no double jeopardy concerns because a person is
not being criminally punished twice for the same act. 66 And there are
no due process concerns because due process does not require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in probate cases. 67 Although
abandonment statutes have been criticized as not actually deterring
deadbeat parents from abandoning their children, 68 there is some
evidence that because slayer statutes have existed for so long, they do
have some deterring effect. 69
C. Elder Abuse by Family Members Can Be Disincentivized, and
Reporting on Elder Abuse by Family Members Can Be Incentivized
One question that remains is whether enacting a disinheritance
statute would actually disincentivize elder abuse. Some claim that
certain forms of elder abuse may not be deterrable. The abuser may
be aware of certain future consequences of his actions, but he
criminal punishments for the same offense.”). However, courts must still find that it was a
legislature’s intent to make a statute a civil statute. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399
(1938). And the court must find that the civil statute was not so punitive in effect as to
“transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Rex Trailer
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1995). Because inheritance is a civil matter and
given completely to the states to decide, however, it is unlikely that any disinheritance statute
would be considered a criminal penalty.
64. Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d at 711.
65. See supra notes 45–46.
66. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. See also supra note 53.
67. Cary v. Riss, 433 S.E.2d 546, 552–53 (W. Va. 1993) (outlining the minimal
requirements of notice for due process in probate cases).
68. Theresa Louise Davis, Not Just for Kids: Why Georgia’s Statutory Disinheritance of
Deadbeat Parents Should Extend to Intestate Adults, 43 GA. L. REV. 867, 891 (2009)
(“Nonetheless, deterrence is a legitimate goal if, in even one case, an abandonment statute
influences a parent to support or care for a child, especially where the child possesses a
significant estate during life.”).
69. Sneddon, supra note 58, at 103 (“To the extent that a potential killer is aware of the
possible application of the slayer rule, he or she may be deterred from committing an
economically motivated killing.”). See also Callie Kramer, Guilty by Association: Inadequacies in
the Uniform Probate Code Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 697, 702 (2003)
(“Thus, the slayer rule has an effect on deterring economically motivated killings.”).
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commits the abuse without taking these consequences into
account. 70 Although caretaker frustrations may cause certain forms of
elder abuse, 71 other forms of elder abuse, including financial elder
abuse and neglect, can also occur because the family member wants
to enhance his share of the elder’s estate. Further, disinheritance
statutes reflect the will of the elder and comply with the equitable
principle that individuals should not reap benefit from their wrongs.
Many forms of elder abuse are caused by an abuser’s desire to
gain from the abused’s estate—that is, the possibility of gaining from
the estate creates an incentive to abuse. This may be due to the
definition of elder abuse, which is broader than the definitions of
other kinds of abuse, including such concepts as financial abuse and
exploitation, 72 but it may also be due to the nature of elder abuse.
Elder abuse can occur not only when the abuser intentionally assaults
the abused, but also when the abuser intentionally withholds care
from the abused. 73 For example, a caretaker child of an aging parent
may refuse to seek medical attention for his parent because he does
not want the parent’s estate to be reduced by medical bills. 74
Another example comes from In re Estate of Lowrie, in which the son
of the abused elder isolated the elder from her family and
community in order to influence her to change her will, mainly
benefitting himself. 75 These examples show that unlike other forms
of abuse, rooted in many psychological and emotional causes, elder
70. Spivack, supra note 8, at 275–76.
71. BONNIE BRANDL ET AL., ELDER ABUSE AND INTERVENTION: A COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH 38 (2007) (noting that “[g]iven the challenges that sometimes occur when
providing care for an older person, the notion that caregivers can be pushed past their limits
resonates with professionals and community members,” but noting also that “more recent
studies have not supported caregiver stress as a primary cause of elder abuse”).
72. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (West 2014) (including not only definitions of physical
and emotional elder abuse but also a definition of financial exploitation that includes
“[o]btaining an individual’s money or property by deceiving or enticing the individual, or by
forcing, compelling, or coercing the individual to give, sell at less than fair market value, or in
other ways convey money or property against his or her will without his or her informed
consent”).
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9D-2 (Lexis 2014) (“Neglect. The intentional or
unintentional failure by the caregiver to obtain adequate goods or services for the elderly
person’s maintenance and well-being. Examples include a caregiver who fails to buy groceries
or prescription medications.”).
74. Farah Farouque, Our Frail Elderly Are Being Abused, THE AGE (Mar. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Our-frail-elderly-are-being-abused/
2005/03/18/1111086011259.html.
75. In re Estate of Lowrie, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 829–31 Cal. Ct App (2004).
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abuse, at least in some cases, is caused by monetary incentives in that
the abusers may harm or refuse care to the elder to ensure that their
share of the estate is maximized when the victim dies. 76 In cases
where the abuse is an avenue to getting some or all of the elder’s
estate, elder abuse can be disincentivized.
Even in cases where the caretaker’s frustration or carelessness
leads to abuse, some authors claim that a disinheritance clause could
inspire more patience and dutiful care. 77 In general, there are both
skeptics and advocates of law as a deterrent, 78 and this is true of
disinheritance statutes as well. Most critics claim that enacting a law
does not deter in many cases because potential perpetrators may be
unaware of the intricacies of the law. 79 However, some advocates of
law as a deterrent claim statutes that have become common
knowledge—such as slayer statutes—may deter individuals who
would otherwise consider killing in order to inherit. 80 If the
argument advanced against disinheritance statutes as a deterrent is
that these laws would deter abusers only if more people knew about
them, then it seems counterintuitive not to enact the law. Enacting
and enforcing a law brings notice and eventually the law too, may
become common knowledge in the same way that slayer
statutes have. 81
Even if elder abuse disinheritance statutes would not deter all
forms of elder abuse, they may still be rationalized in the same way
that the common law doctrine of undue influence and many other
disinheritance statutes are rationalized: The statute reflects the will of
the elder, 82 and individuals should not reap benefits from their
76. Id.
77. See Korpus, supra note 11, at 573 (“People that know that misconduct could cost
them their inheritances would be more motivated to react promptly to the needs of dependent
family members, invest time and energy into maintaining emotional control, seek assistance
when they feel overwhelmed, and find appropriate outlets for frustration and anger.”).
78. See Faulkner, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
79. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, J. LEGAL STUD.
259, 260 n.7 (1972) (giving a general overview of relevant literature and noting that the
general idea of law as a deterrent “has been seriously questioned in the criminological literature
of the past hundred years or so”).
80. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81. Cf. Liezl Walker, The Deterrent Value of Imposing Prison Sentences for Tax Crimes,
26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 21 (2000) (“In order for the threat of
prison to have any deterrent value, the general public must be aware that the Guidelines
mandate the imposition of a prison term.”).
82. Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What’s
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wrongful acts. 83 If the elder could have made a decision free from
whatever psychological or physical influence the abuser had over her,
then the elder would have disinherited the abuser. 84 And because
probate law serves the ultimate purpose of allowing for testamentary
freedom, 85 a disinheritance statute should ensure that the abuser is
disinherited in cases where elders themselves are unable to
disinherit abusers.
Some may be concerned that such a statute is overbroad, leading
to disinheritance even in cases where elders themselves would not
want to disinherit. This is a question of the drafting of the statute,
however, and by limiting the scope of the statute, a state may ensure
that the statute will not reach individuals that the elder himself
would not want to disinherit. California, for example, has included a
ratification clause in its disinheritance statute that makes the statute
ineffective if the alleged abuser can prove that the elder “was
substantially able to manage his or her financial resources and to
resist fraud or undue influence” after the time of the alleged abuse. 86
This ensures that acts that could arguably be considered abuse will
not be considered abuse by a court if the elder had capacity to
change his or her estate plan after the act and failed to do so.
III. UNDUE INFLUENCE IS INEFFECTIVE TO REMEDY ELDER ABUSE
Undue influence cannot solve elder abuse because it provides no
major disincentive for potential elder abusers. First, an undue
influence action targets only financial elder abuse, not physical abuse.
Second, a successful undue influence action prevents the perpetrator
from getting more than his intestate share of the victim’s estate but

Love Got to Do with It?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 841, 868 (1996).
83. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another—A Statutory
Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 715 (1936) (“I[t] has long been the policy of the common
law that no one should be allowed to profit by his own wrong; the maxim, Nullus commodum
capere potest de injuria sua propria, in one or another of its forms, has had a very general
application both at law and in equity. That a man who murders another and then seeks to take
property as a result of his death is attempting to take advantage of his own wrong is clear.”).
84. Cf. Spivack, supra note 8, at 287 (arguing that spousal abuse victims may “intend”
to give assets to abusers in a shallow sense of the word, but that because of the psychological
brainwash of abuse, this intent is tainted and should give way to other, more just factors).
85. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453
(2002).
86. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(c) (West 2012).
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does not penalize him for attempting to get more. Third, even a
successful challenge still results in the perpetrator getting an intestate
share. I will use the scenario of James and Ms. Brown, the account
with which I introduced this paper, to illustrate how this doctrine
would be ineffective in certain situations.
Many states do not have legislation that disinherits elder abusers.
In these states, the only possible remedy to elder abuse is laws that
serve other purposes, including tort laws and the common law
doctrine of undue influence. In most will contests, however,
allegations of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity are
the primary arguments used to seek to invalidate a will. 87 Undue
influence will not protect elders from physical abuse or neglect by
family members. 88 Undue influence will only protect the elder’s
estate from being inherited by an abuser when an abuser seeks to
coerce a testator into making an inter vivos or testamentary transfer
against her will. 89 But there is significant evidence that the doctrine
of undue influence fails in this respect as well. 90 Undue influence is
notoriously difficult to prove, 91 and it is often applied inconsistently
by courts. 92 It has also been criticized as “vague and destructive.” 93
Undue influence works only where a perpetrator seeks to get
more than his “fair share.” 94 Even if it can be shown that the

87. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests: An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 607, 647–49 (1987); Kurt Wanless, Rethinking Oregon’s Law of Undue Influence in Will
Contests, 76 OR. L. REV. 1027 (1997) (finding that “undue influence is among the most
common cause of action used to contest wills”).
88. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 278–79 (1988);
EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 7:1 (2d ed. 2012).
89. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 88; ROSS & REED, supra note 88.
90. Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be
Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 250 (2010).
91. Hyatt v. Wroten, 43 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ark. 1931). (noting that undue influence “is
generally exercised in secret, not openly, and, like a snake crawling upon a rock, it leaves no
track behind it, but its sinister and insidious effect must be determined from facts and
circumstances surrounding the testator, his physical and mental condition as shown by the
evidence, and the opportunity of the beneficiary of the influenced bequest to mold the mind of
the testator to suit his or her purposes”); Frolik, supra note 82, at 851 (“For any claim of
undue influence to succeed, it must be proven that the testator was susceptible to the will of
the influencer, and so it is very difficult to successfully claim undue influence if the testator is
physically robust and mentally alert.”).
92. David W. Kirch, A Donor’s Rights to Disposition of Assets Versus Undue Influence
Protection, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2010, at 47.
93. Spivack, supra note 90.
94. See Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Miss. 1987) (claiming that the
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perpetrator did get more than his fair share under a will and the will
is thrown out, the perpetrator can still inherit if the perpetrator is a
family member or there is another valid will bequest. 95 This means
not only that physical elder abuse is not remedied by this doctrine,
but also that coercion, emotional abuse, intentional isolation, and
other forms of abuse cannot be remedied where the abuser would
not receive any more than he would receive under intestacy. If the
perpetrator did not receive more under the estate plan than he would
have received under a state’s intestacy laws, the amount that he will
inherit will not be reduced, even if a court finds undue influence.
Other beneficiaries will have little incentive to present a case, making
discovery of abuse unlikely.
In Ms. Brown’s case, the prosecutors were unable to find enough
evidence for conviction for involuntary manslaughter, 96 and there is
no indication that there was a will contest. Thus, the doctrine of
undue influence was ineffective and would have been ineffective,
even if James had intentionally physically assaulted his mother.
IV. EXISTING DISINHERITANCE STATUTES ARE INEFFECTIVE TO
REMEDY ELDER ABUSE
The different types of deficiencies in existing elder abuse
disinheritance statutes divide those statutes into three categories:
statutes that require a criminal conviction to be effective, statutes
that target only financial elder abuse, and statutes that do not
completely disinherit abusers. Several of the states’ statutes fall into
both the first and second categories by requiring a criminal
conviction before the disinheritance statute can apply and by
targeting only financial elder abuse. I will take each of these types of
statute in turn and explain why they are ineffective against many
forms of elder abuse. I will use the scenario of James and Ms. Brown,

entire reason for the appeal was the “use of undue influence to obtain a larger than fair share of
the family property”).
95. Wehrheim v. Golden Pond Assisted Living Facility, 905 So. 2d 1002, 1008 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“The Wehrheims argue that only the testamentary portion of the will is
invalid based on the undue influence exerted on the decedent and that the revocation clause is
unaffected by the wrongdoing and, therefore, valid. Thus, they assert the revocation clause
invalidates the prior wills thereby requiring intestacy proceedings which would allow them to
share in the decedent’s estate.”).
96. Campbell, supra note 1.
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with certain modifications, to illustrate how these statutes would be
ineffective in certain situations.
A. Statutes That Require a Criminal Conviction to be Effective
Arizona, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and Oregon all
require that the abuser be convicted under the relevant criminal elder
abuse statute in order to be disinherited. 97 In Oregon, an “‘[a]buser’
means a person who is convicted of a felony by reason of conduct
that constitutes physical abuse . . . or financial abuse.” 98 In Arizona,
the disinheritance statute can be applied only to fiduciaries of the
decedent, and only if the fiduciary does not “use the vulnerable
adult’s assets solely for the benefit of the vulnerable adult.” 99 In
Kentucky, the disinheritance statute comes into effect only if the
abuser “victimizes the decedent by the commission of any felony
under KRS Chapter 209.” 100 KRS Chapter 209 includes descriptions
of felonies for both financial and physical elder abuse. 101 In
Maryland, a conviction of financial elder abuse can lead to a prison
sentence “not exceeding 15 years,” if the abuser manipulated over
$1,000 of the elder’s estate, and the abuser can be disinherited if he
“fails to restore fully the property taken or its value as ordered.” 102
Michigan’s disinheritance statute applies only to an individual “who
is convicted of committing abuse, neglect, or exploitation.” 103
Illinois bars inheritance to individuals that are “convicted of financial
exploitation, abuse, or neglect of an elderly person.” 104
Requiring a high standard of proof before disinheritance creates
a disincentive to report and a disincentive to litigate. Convictions
under elder abuse statutes are fueled by mandated reports and thus
fail for the same reason that criminal elder abuse statutes fail: elders

97. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456; 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/2-6.2 (West
2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801
(West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2803 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
112.455 (West 2013).
98. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.455 (West 2013).
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456. (Lexis 2014)
100. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (West 2012).
101. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.020 (West 2012).
102. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801 (West 2013), amended by 2013 MD. LAWS
415.
103. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2803 (West 2012).
104. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2 (West 2013).
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and their family members are pressured by society and by abusers to
not report the abuse. 105 Although the possibility of disinheriting a
rival claimant gives some incentive to report, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a standard that is extremely difficult to
overcome. 106 Some states may see the requirement of a conviction as
a necessity to ensure that frivolous lawsuits are not filed simply as
another weapon in the arsenal of a messy fight amongst potential
beneficiaries. Although keeping out frivolous lawsuits may be a
legitimate concern, one state statute that requires a looser standard
of proof uses standing requirements to ensure that frivolous lawsuits
are weeded out, 107 and judges have many other doctrines at their
disposal to ensure that a frivolous lawsuit will not lead to a lengthy,
expensive trial. 108
Further, although the accused in a criminal elder abuse case has a
constitutional right to require the prosecution to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, 109 this same constitutional right does not
continue on in the right to inherit. 110 Courts need not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant exercised undue influence or
duress over a decedent to ensure that the defendant does not receive
inheritance under a will, 111 so why should the state require the court
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the abuser committed elder
abuse before barring him from inheriting?
In the example of James and Ms. Brown, where James neglected
his mother to the point that she became physically fused to her own
arm chair, James was convicted under a statute that would have
triggered disinheritance in any one of these states. There are many

105. See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
107. Lickter v. Lickter, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that a
person claiming elder abuse does not have standing unless that person has “an interest that
may be impaired, defeated, or benefited by the proceeding”).
108. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2712 (3d
ed. 1998) (claiming that several Supreme Court cases imply that “summary judgment should
be relied upon to weed out frivolous lawsuits and avoid wasteful trials”).
109. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam).
110. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Cripe v. Atl. First Nat’l Bank of Daytona Beach, 422 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla.
1982) (“The trier of fact determines the question of undue influence, the standard of proof
required of the moving party being the preponderance (greater weight) of the evidence.”); In
re Estate of Wagner, 522 N.W.2d 159, 165 (Neb. 1994) (“The setting aside of a contract for
undue influence requires clear and convincing evidence.”).

465

DO NOT DELETE

4/14/2014 11:28 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

situations like James’s, however, that are not reported. 112 Even the
cases that are reported are not always prosecuted. Also, according to
news reports, James pleaded guilty to the charges against him, 113 but
it is not clear that he would have been convicted if he had pleaded
not guilty. Thus, there are many protections that are afforded
criminal defendants like James, and it falls to state legislatures to
determine whether these protections are necessary when an
individual’s inheritance, and not his constitutional rights, is at stake.
B. Statutes That Target Only Financial Elder Abuse
Arizona, Maryland, and Washington have disinheritance statutes
that fail to include physical abuse, sexual abuse, and psychological
abuse as disinheritance-worthy offenses. Like the doctrine of undue
influence, these statutes seem to limit themselves to a very literal
construction of the common law maxim used to justify slayer
statutes: no one can benefit from his (or her) own wrongdoing. 114 If
that is the rationale behind not including physical elder abuse as a
disinheritance-worthy act, however, then the creators of these
statutes failed to recognize that many forms of physical elder abuse
can also create a tangible benefit for the abuser. 115 For example, the
abuse can be a method of keeping the elder from spending or
distributing her assets in a way that could take money away from the
amount that the abuser would inherit. Thus, it is hard to see why
even a strict construction of the wrongful-benefiting rationale would
justify excluding so many forms of abuse from the statute.
Arizona’s elder abuse statute provides the following:
A person who is in a position of trust and confidence to a
vulnerable adult shall use the vulnerable adult’s assets solely for the
benefit of the vulnerable adult and not for the benefit of the person
who is in the position of trust and confidence to the vulnerable
adult or the person’s relatives. 116

This statute fails to consider two separate situations that are
common in elder abuse cases. First, the statute fails to address

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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situations where the abuser is an intended beneficiary under a will,
but not in a “position of trust and confidence.” 117 For example, the
abuser could be a relative that is not a trustee of the elder, but who
stands to inherit from the elder’s estate. Second, this statute fails to
address situations where assets are simply withheld from the elder. 118
Maryland’s elder abuse statute is much broader than Arizona’s,
but it also fails to include a disinheritance clause for the physical
abuse of elders. The statute provides in relevant parts that “a person
may not knowingly and willfully obtain by deception, intimidation,
or undue influence the property of an individual that the person
knows or reasonably should know is at least 68 years old, with intent
to deprive the individual of the individual’s property,” 119 and “a
person may not knowingly and willfully obtain by deception,
intimidation, or undue influence the property of an individual that
the person knows or reasonably should know is a vulnerable adult
with intent to deprive the vulnerable adult of the vulnerable adult’s
property.” 120 This statute, unlike Arizona’s disinheritance statute,
includes the concept of withholding property as a disinheritanceworthy act, but it still fails to address many forms of physical abuse
that could be deterred.
Washington’s disinheritance statute is effective only if financial
exploitation was committed. 121 However, like the Maryland statute,
the Washington statute is broad and includes this definition of
financial exploitation: “‘Financial exploitation’ means the illegal or
improper use, control over, or withholding of the property, income,
resources, or trust funds of the vulnerable adult by any person or
entity for any person’s or entity’s profit or advantage other than for
the vulnerable adult’s profit or advantage.” 122 This also addresses the
problem of the abuser withholding assets, but again, it does not
address the problem of physical elder abuse.
Washington’s statutory scheme does show some innovation,
however, in lowering the standard of proof that is required to
disinherit an abuser. In the absence of a criminal conviction, a court
may determine “[b]y clear, cogent, and convincing evidence whether
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Farouque, supra note 74.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(b) (West 2013).
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.84.010 (West 2013).
Id. § 74.34.020 (Westlaw).
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a person participated in conduct constituting financial exploitation
against the decedent.” 123
Physical abuse often accompanies financial elder abuse and may
be one of the intimidation methods used to coerce the elder to
change a will in favor of the abuser, distribute assets inter vivos to
the abuser, or make the abuser a designee on a life insurance policy
or retirement plan. 124 In cases where physical abuse is present, but it
is less clear that the abuser committed financial exploitation, these
statutes would be ineffective in keeping the abuser from reaping
benefits from the harm that she caused the elder. 125 However, there
are other reasons for barring inheritance from physical elder abusers,
including taking advantage of law’s expressive function and possibly
deterring such abuse. 126
In the case of James and Ms. Brown, James would have been
disinherited in Arizona only if it could be proven that he had a
fiduciary duty to Ms. Brown. This may have been the case, but it is
easy to imagine a similar case in which James was not a fiduciary. In
that case, James would still be able to inherit. In Maryland, James
may have been convicted under the financial elder abuse statute
because it includes such concepts as “depriv[ing] the vulnerable
adult of the vulnerable adult’s property,” 127 but it is not clear that
Ms. Brown was deprived of her property. She allegedly requested to
die at home, 128 and if she had requested to be taken to the hospital,
nothing indicates that James would not have complied with this
request. In Washington, James would not have needed a conviction
of financial elder abuse to be disinherited, but there would still have
to be clear and convincing evidence that James withheld property or
resources for the advantage of someone other than Ms. Brown. It is
clear that James withheld resources to the disadvantage of Ms.
Brown, but it is not clear that he withheld resources to the advantage

123. Id. § 11-84-150 (Westlaw).
124. Namkee G. Choi & James Mayer, Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation: Risk
Factors and Prevention Strategies, J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK, Oct. 2008, at 5, 10
(“More often than not, however, multiple forms of abuse and neglect are committed
simultaneously. For example, it is quite likely that physical abuse is accompanied by
psychological abuse and/or neglect.”).
125. In re Estate of Lowrie, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 829–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
126. See supra note 8 and notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
127. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(b) (West 2013).
128. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2012).
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of anyone, including himself. Thus, it may be difficult to find the
clear and convincing evidence needed to disinherit James in
Washington.
C. Statutes That Do Not Completely Bar Inheritance for Elder Abusers
Although California, like Washington, has shown innovation in
lowering the standard of proof necessary to disinherit elder abusers,
it fails to completely disinherit abusers. This is problematic because it
provides much less incentive for family members to bring an elder
abuse claim. California’s elder abuse statute claims to “disinherit”
abusers “where all of the following apply:” (1) there is clear and
convincing evidence that the abuse occurred, (2) the alleged abuser
acted in bad faith, (3) the alleged abuser is found to have been
“reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious,” and (4) the abused is
found to have been “substantially unable to manage his or her
financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence.” 129
However, this disinheritance clause applies only “to the extent
provided in subdivision (c).” 130
Subdivision (c) states that an abuser will not be able to share in
the judgment from a civil case brought by the decedent’s estate
against the abuser. 131 This still means that the abuser will be able to
inherit everything that she would have otherwise, just minus her
share of a judgment against her. 132
If James and Ms. Brown had lived in California, James’s siblings
or another beneficiary under the will would be able to file a civil suit
against James, acting in the interest of Ms. Brown. If the suit was
successful, and the judge entered judgment in the amount of
$100,000 against James, then this amount would be given to the
estate of Ms. Brown. James would not be able to inherit any fraction
of this $100,000, but he would still be able to inherit anything else
that the will specified. The only way that this statute would act as a
complete bar to inheritance is if the judge decided that Ms. Brown

129. Id. § 259(a)(Westlaw).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 259(c)(Westlaw).
132. In re Estate of Lowrie, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 829–30 (Cal. App. 2004); Spivack,
supra note 7, at 275 (“The abuser is barred, . . . only from inheriting monies that were added
to the decedent’s estate as the result of an action based on the abuse.”).
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had suffered in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of
Ms. Brown’s estate.
V. ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
As shown above, the one drawback to California’s legislation is
that its penalty is too weak. Its strengths are that it already includes a
ratification clause to ensure that elders actually intend to disinherit
abusers, and it has a lower burden of proof. To transform this statute
into one that effectively disinherits elder abusers, I propose the
following modifications: (1) the definition of elder abuse should be
included in the statute and not referenced to the criminal code, and
it should specifically include sexual elder abuse as a disinheritanceworthy offense; (2) there should be a provision stating that the filing
of a petition to disinherit on grounds of elder abuse does not, as a
matter of public policy, violate a no-contest clause; (3) the statute
should specify who has standing, instead of relying on case law to
determine this; and (4) the statute should completely—and not just
partially—disinherit abusers.
A. Definition
Most states recognize at least three main forms of elder abuse:
physical abuse, financial abuse, and sexual abuse. 133 For many states,
physical harm or serious physical harm will trigger the physical abuse
statute. 134 For others, the harm must be done purposely or
knowingly. 135 Financial abuse includes using the assets of the elder
for the benefit of others besides the elder without the elder’s consent
in most states, 136 but a few also provide that an individual commits
financial elder abuse by withholding the elder’s assets from her. 137
133. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
46.90(a) (West 2013) (“‘Abuse’ means any of the following: 1. Physical abuse. 2. Emotional
abuse. 3. Sexual abuse.”).
134. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-101(4)(a)(1) (West 2013) (applies to adults “found
to be in a situation or condition that poses an imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm to
the adult”).
135. 473 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 7-002 (2002) (abuse includes “knowingly or
intentionally causing” harm).
136. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:3-114.5(f) (West 2013) (‘‘Financial abuse means to
wrongfully take, appropriate, obtain, or retain, or assist in taking, appropriating, obtaining, or
retaining, real or personal property of an elder by any means, including undue influence, or
with intent to defraud the elder.”).
137. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30(a)(1) (West 2013) (stating that

470

DO NOT DELETE

445

4/14/2014 11:28 AM

Disincentivizing Elder Abuse Through Disinheritance

Sexual elder abuse includes the touching, fondling, or penetrating of
an elder without his or her consent for sexual gratification. 138 Other
forms of abuse covered in state statutes include neglect, emotional
abuse, psychological suffering, and isolation. 139 Because many states
have already defined elder abuse in broad terms, a cross reference
from the disinheritance statute is all that would be necessary for
them. For states that have either not defined elder abuse or have
overbroad elder abuse statutes, however, a completely new definition
may be useful.
B. No-Contest Clauses
Because the purpose of a disinheritance statute is to remove
barriers for family members and other interested persons to bring
actions against elder abusers, it makes sense to include a provision
that would make any no-contest clause in the governing instrument
inapplicable to such actions. 140 Many states have statutes that nullify
no-contest clauses when a claimant has probable cause to contest the
will. 141 Such statutes would likely apply to elder abuse disinheritance
statutes, but in states where no-contest clauses are given more
deference, it would be wise to include a provision in the
disinheritance statute itself stating that, for public policy reasons, nocontest clauses would not be triggered in the event that the will
contest alleges elder abuse.

financial abuse occurs when an individual “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains
real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to
defraud, or both”).
138. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.31 (McKinney 2010); 651 MASS. CODE REGS.
5.02(2) (2004); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, pt. VII, § 1239 (2013).
139. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.07 (West 2013).
140. Cf. David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1675, 1734 (2009) (arguing that the doctrine of unconscionability should steer courts’
decisions in probate law in order to ensure that no-contest clauses do not lead to inequitable
results). While I agree with Professor Horton’s analysis, I propose a solution that circumvents
the need of probate courts to apply unconscionability in general: I include a waiver of nocontest clauses in the statute itself.
141. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21311(a) (West 2013) (“A no contest clause shall only
be enforced against the following types of contests: (1) A direct contest that is brought
without probable cause.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.005 (West 2011) (“Notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary in the will, a devisee’s share must not be reduced or eliminated
under a no-contest clause because the devisee institutes legal action seeking to invalidate a will
if the legal action is instituted in good faith and based on probable cause that would have led a
reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that the will is invalid.”).
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C. Zone of Interest
Courts in California have had to look to legislative history to find
standing for individuals other than the personal representative of the
decedent, and they have found that an “interested” party, meaning
any person that has “an interest that may be impaired, defeated, or
benefited by the proceeding” has standing to sue. 142 Like the scheme
that the courts in California have created, an effective statute should
allow standing to interested persons: close relatives of the decedent,
the personal representative, and anyone who has an interest, vested or
contingent, in the estate that is in question.
D. Proposed Modifications to California Probate Code § 259 143
(a) Any interested person shall be deemed to have predeceased a
decedent to the extent provided in subdivision (c) where all of the
following apply:
(1) It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
person is liable for physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, or financial
abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult.
(2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith.
(3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious in the commission of any of these acts upon
the decedent.
(4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter
until the time of his or her death, has been found to have been
substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or to
resist fraud or undue influence.
(b) Any person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent
to the extent provided in subdivision (c) if that person has been
convicted of a violation of [the criminal elder abuse statute of the
state].
(c) Predeceasing a decedent includes forfeiting all benefits under
this article with respect to the decedent’s estate, including a device,
an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse’s or child’s
share, a homestead allowance, a family allowance, and exempt

142. Lickter v. Lickter, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 127 (Cal. App. 2010), review denied (Jan.
26, 2011), reh’g denied (Nov. 18, 2010).
143. I have underlined the modifications that I propose to the statute.
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property. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s intestate
estate passes as if the abuser disclaimed his or her intestate share.
(d) For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall
apply:
(1) “Physical abuse” means the sustaining of any physical injury
by a vulnerable adult as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as
a result of a malicious act by any person. 144
(2) “Neglect” means the willful deprivation of a vulnerable adult
of adequate food, clothing, essential medical treatment or
rehabilitative therapy, shelter, or supervision.
(3) “Financial abuse” means any action that involves the misuse
of a vulnerable adult’s funds, property, or person.
(4) “Sexual abuse” includes the touching, fondling, or
penetrating of an elder or vulnerable adult for sexual gratification
without his or her consent.
(5) “Elder adult” means any individual who has attained the age
of 68 years.
(6) “Interested Person” means (i) the personal representative of
the estate at issue, or (ii) any person with an interest, vested or
contingent, in the estate at issue, or (iii) any person who would be
an intestate heir of the decedent if the decedent has died intestate.
(e) Any no-contest clauses in a will or other instrument that
would preclude a suit under this article are void as against public
policy. 145
VI. CONCLUSION
An elder abuse statute would be particularly relevant for the
Uniform Probate Code because such a statute and the Uniform
Probate Code both aim to provide for the just and efficient
disposition of elders’ estates in today’s world. 146 With elders today
living much longer than they have in the past, 147 in order to ensure

144. Although these are the original definitions used in California Probate Code § 259, I
have included definitions to the terms themselves, instead of referencing the criminal code.
145. The original statute can be found in Appendix 1.
146. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102 (amended 1993) (“The underlying purposes and
policies of this [code] are: (1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of
decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated persons; . . . [and] (3)
to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making
distribution to his successors.”).
147. Laura B. Shrestha, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32792, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN THE
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that elders’ estates are efficiently disposed of, it is necessary to
protect their intent even after death and provide disincentives
towards those that intend them harm. The fact that eight states have
already enacted a similar kind of statute speaks to its necessity, but
there is still a need for a model statute that other states could adopt;
California’s statute is a good candidate to be that model.
Travis Hunt*
Appendix 1
(a) Any person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent
to the extent provided in subdivision (c) where all of the following
apply:
(1) It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
person is liable for physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse of the
decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult.
(2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith.
(3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious in the commission of any of these acts upon
the decedent.
(4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter
until the time of his or her death, has been found to have been
substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or to
resist fraud or undue influence.
(b) Any person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent
to the extent provided in subdivision (c) if that person has been
convicted of a violation of Section 236 of the Penal Code or any
offense described in Section 368 of the Penal Code.
(c) Any person found liable under subdivision (a) or convicted
under subdivision (b) shall not (1) receive any property, damages, or
costs that are awarded to the decedent’s estate in an action described
in subdivision (a) or (b), whether that person’s entitlement is under
a will, a trust, or the laws of intestacy; or (2) serve as a fiduciary as
defined in Section 39, if the instrument nominating or appointing
UNITED STATES (2006) (noting that “life expectancy at birth for the total population has
th
reached an all-time American high level, 77.5 years, up from 49.2 years at the turn of the 20
century”).
* J.D. Candidate, April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. Travis would like to thank Professor Rust Tippett, whose expert knowledge of
probate law proved invaluable in crafting this Comment.
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that person was executed during the period when the decedent was
substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or resist
fraud or undue influence. This section shall not apply to a decedent
who, at any time following the act or acts described in paragraph (1)
of subdivision (a), or the act or acts described in subdivision (b), was
substantially able to manage his or her financial resources and to
resist fraud or undue influence within the meaning of subdivision (b)
of Section 1801 of the Probate Code and subdivision (b) of Section
39 of the Civil Code.
(d) For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall
apply:
(1) “Physical abuse” as defined in Section 15610.63 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
(2) “Neglect” as defined in Section 15610.57 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
(3) “False imprisonment” as defined in Section 368 of the Penal
Code.
(4) “Financial abuse” as defined in Section 15610.30 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
severance and transfer of an action or proceeding to a separate civil
action pursuant to Section 801.
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